



2023/2798

12.12.2023

COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2023/2798

of 11 December 2023

implementing Article 12(2) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1770 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Mali

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1770 of 28 September 2017 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Mali ⁽¹⁾, and in particular Article 12(2) and (6) thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,

Whereas:

- (1) On 28 September 2017, the Council adopted Regulation (EU) 2017/1770.
- (2) On 13 December 2021, the Council adopted Council Regulation (EU) 2021/2201 ⁽²⁾ to give effect to Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/2208 ⁽³⁾, which amended Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/1775 ⁽⁴⁾ and established a new framework providing for additional restrictive measures against individuals and entities responsible for or complicit in, or having engaged, directly or indirectly, in actions or policies that threaten the peace, security or stability of Mali, or for obstructing or undermining the successful completion of Mali's political transition.
- (3) The Council has reviewed the list of natural and legal persons, entities and bodies in Annex Ia to Regulation (EU) 2017/1770. On the basis of that review, one person should be removed from that list and the reasons in the entries for two other persons should be amended.
- (4) Annex Ia to Regulation (EU) 2017/1770 should therefore be amended accordingly,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

Annex Ia to Regulation (EU) 2017/1770 is amended in accordance with the Annex to this Regulation.

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

⁽¹⁾ OJ L 251, 29.9.2017, p. 1.

⁽²⁾ Council Regulation (EU) 2021/2201 of 13 December 2021 amending Regulation (EU) 2017/1770 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Mali (OJ L 446, 14.12.2021, p. 1).

⁽³⁾ Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/2208 of 13 December 2021 amending Decision (CFSP) 2017/1775 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Mali (OJ L 446, 14.12.2021, p. 44).

⁽⁴⁾ Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/1775 of 28 September 2017 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Mali (OJ L 251, 29.9.2017, p. 23).

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 11 December 2023.

For the Council
The President
J. BORRELL FONTELLES

In Annex Ia to Regulation (EU) 2017/1770, the 'List of natural or legal persons, entities and bodies referred to in Article 2b' is amended as follows:

(1) entries 3 and 4 are replaced by the following:

	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
'3.	MAÏGA, Choguel	Place of birth: Tabango, Gao, Mali Date of birth: 31.12.1958 Nationality: Malian Passport number: diplomatic passport DA0004473, issued by Mali, Schengen visa issued Gender: male Position: Prime Minister	<p>As Prime Minister since June 2021, Choguel Maïga leads the Transition Government of Mali established following the coup of 24 May 2021. Contrary to the timetable for reform and elections previously agreed with ECOWAS in line with the Transition Charter, he announced in June 2021 the organisation of the National Consultations for Refoundation (<i>Assises nationales de la refondation</i>, ANR) as a pre-reform process and a precondition to the organisation of the elections scheduled for 27 February 2022.</p> <p>As announced by Choguel Maïga himself, the ANR were then postponed several times and the elections delayed. The ANR, which were eventually held in December 2021, were boycotted by multiple stakeholders. On the basis of the final recommendations of the ANR, the Transition Government presented a new timetable providing for the holding of presidential elections in December 2025, thus allowing the Transition Authorities to stay in power for more than five years. Following a revised timetable presented in June 2022, providing for the holding of presidential elections in March 2024, the Transition Government announced on 21 September 2023 a further postponement of the elections.</p> <p>ECOWAS adopted individual sanctions against the Transition Authorities (including Choguel Maïga) in November 2021 for their delay in organising the elections and the completion of the political transition of Mali. ECOWAS underlined that the Transition Authorities have used the need to implement reforms as a pretext to justify the extension of the political transition of Mali and to maintain themselves in power without democratic elections. On 3 July 2022, ECOWAS decided to maintain those individual sanctions.</p> <p>In his position as Prime Minister, Choguel Maïga is directly responsible for postponing the elections foreseen in the Transition Charter, and he is therefore obstructing and undermining the successful completion of the political transition of Mali, in particular by obstructing and undermining the holding of elections and the handover of power to elected authorities.</p>	4.2.2022

	Name	Identifying information	Reasons	Date of listing
4.	MAÏGA, Ibrahim Ikassa	Place of birth: Tondibi, Gao region, Mali Date of birth: 5.2.1971 Nationality: Malian Passport number: diplomatic passport issued by Mali Gender: male Position: Minister of Refoundation	<p>Ibrahim Ikassa Maïga is a member of the strategic committee of M5-RFP (<i>Mouvement du 5 juin – Rassemblement des forces patriotiques</i>), which played a key role in the overthrow of President Keita.</p> <p>As Minister of Refoundation since June 2021, Ibrahim Ikassa Maïga was entrusted with planning the National Consultations for Refoundation (<i>Assises nationales de la Refondation</i>, ANR) announced by Prime Minister Choguel Maïga.</p> <p>Contrary to the timetable for reform and elections previously agreed with ECOWAS in line with the Transition Charter, the ANR were announced by the Transition Government as a pre-reform process and a precondition to the organisation of the elections scheduled for 27 February 2022.</p> <p>As announced by Choguel Maïga, the ANR were then postponed several times and the elections delayed. The ANR, which were eventually held in December 2021, were boycotted by multiple stakeholders. On the basis of the final recommendations of the ANR, the Transition Government presented a new timetable providing for the holding of presidential elections in December 2025, thus allowing the Transition Authorities to stay in power for more than five years. Following a revised timetable presented in June 2022, providing for the holding of presidential elections in March 2024, the Transition Government announced on 21 September 2023 a further postponement of the elections.</p> <p>ECOWAS adopted individual sanctions against the Transition Authorities (including Ibrahim Ikassa Maïga) in November 2021 for their delay in organising the elections and the completion of the political transition of Mali. ECOWAS underlined that the Transition Authorities have used the need to implement reforms as a pretext to justify the extension of the political transition of Mali and to maintain themselves in power without democratic elections. On 3 July 2022, ECOWAS decided to maintain those individual sanctions.</p> <p>In his position as Minister of Refoundation, Ibrahim Ikassa Maïga is obstructing and undermining the successful completion of the political transition of Mali, in particular by obstructing and undermining the holding of elections and the handover of power to elected authorities.</p>	4.2.2022';

(2) entry 5 is deleted.